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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the decade of the 1990s, major emphasis in Pakistan remained on 
fiscal reform as a part of the reform programmes undertaken by the various 
governments of Pakistan. Fiscal reform assumes significance considering the high 
budget deficits that Pakistan has been experiencing. These have added to Pakistan’s 
total debt burden in general and external debt in particular. Increase in the burden of 
debt adds to debt-servicing expenditure which further feeds back into the issue of 
high fiscal deficit. Debt-servicing increased to almost 47 percent1 by the middle of 
the decade of 1990s and comprised 8.3 percent of the GDP, up from less than 1 
percent mid-1960s. Pakistan’s external debt at over $32 billion2 in 1998 was 41 
percent of its GNP which was amongst the highest in the South Asian region with 
India’s at 20 percent of GNP in the same year and Sri Lanka’s also at 41 percent3 of 
its GNP. 
In this paper, we attempt to explore the rationale behind the emphases on the 
improvement in both the deficit-to-GDP and the tax-to-GDP ratios that have 
remained the cornerstones of Pakistan’s fiscal reform effort in the decade of the 
1990s. Section 2 is a discussion of the extent of successes and failures of the fiscal 
reform effort thus far and explores the relationship between tax generation and 
budget deficit. Section 3 discusses the impact of expenditures on budget deficit. 
Section 4 shows the rise in dependence on external sources of financing. Section 5 
gives the conclusions. 
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2.  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PAKISTAN’S FISCAL 
REFORM EFFORT IN THE 1990s 
 
Impact on the Tax-to-GDP Ratios 
Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio increased from a low of 4.2 percent4 in 1959-60 
to 6.4 percent in 1969-70. By 1979-80, the same ratio increased to 14.0 percent5 but 
fell to 11.82 percent6 in 1990-91. During the decade of the 1990s, there was 
intensified effort to increase the tax-to-GDP ratio. The measures ranged from 
increase in the rate of direct taxation so as to shift emphasis from indirect to direct 
taxes to even decrease in the rate of direct taxes when the former did not yield the 
desired results. The latter measure was taken with a view to increasing the share of 
direct taxes by broadening the tax base. While the share of direct taxes in total taxes 
did increase significantly, the tax-to-GDP ratio did not increase significantly during 
the 1990s. Rather, the tax-to-GDP ratio ranged between 10.48 percent in FY1999 to 
12.26 percent in FY1995-96. However, the share of direct taxes in total taxes 
increased from 16.6 percent in 1990-91 to 25.7 percent in 1993-94 to 36.4 percent in 
1998-99. This share of direct taxes fell to 32.9 percent again by 2000-01 despite an 
intense tax reform programme undertaken under the auspices of the military 
government that assumed office in October 1999. Even the growth rate of direct 
taxes turned negative in the FY2000 following which direct taxes increased by 21.9 
percent in FY2001 mainly because the base had shrunk the previous year. This was, 
however, not comparable with the growth rates of direct taxes experienced in 
FY1992, 1993, and 1994 when these exceeded 30 percent in each one of the three 
years mentioned. While the overall tax-to-GDP ratio did not record an impressive 
increase during the decade of the 1990s, the direct tax-to-GDP ratio did increase 
steadily and significantly from 1.96 percent in FY1991 to 3.86 percent in FY2001. 
As mentioned earlier, the share of direct taxes in total taxes also increased from 16.6 
percent in FY1991 to 32.9 percent in FY2001. While the share of indirect taxes in 
total taxes decreased accordingly, there was considerable variation in the 
contribution made by the various types of indirect taxes. 
So, one prong of the tax reform strategy was to shift emphasis to direct taxes. 
The other prong was to incorporate the requirements of an internationally liberalising 
trade regime made mandatory for us under the IMF structural adjustment 
programmes on conditions more stringent than the WTO’s itself. As a part of this 
condition of IMF’s balance of payment support, the import duties had to be reduced 
whether or not Pakistan’s industry was ready for foreign competition on home 
ground. As the governments of Pakistan complied, the share of import duties in total 
taxes decreased from 40.8 percent in FY1991 to 15.9 percent in FY2001. The loss in 
 
4Hafiz A. Pasha and Mahnaz Fatima. Op cit., p. 204. 
5Ibid. 
6Our calculations based on.  
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revenues would be compensated by an increase in the sales tax whose share in total 
taxes increased from 16.6 percent in FY1991 to 38.3 percent in FY2001. The 
progressivity in the taxation structure supposedly introduced from a greater share of 
direct taxes would thus be offset by the regressivity from an increasing share of sales 
tax. A taxation structure that remains iniquitous would thus not help in broadening 
the base of taxation significantly. Resistance to tax reform mounted which could 
partly explain why the tax-to-GDP ratio did not register a significant increase during 
the decade of the 1990s despite intense tax reform effort. While the effort did result 
in a significant increase in the direct tax-to-GDP ratio; on the front of indirect taxes, 
it merely substituted revenues from import duties with revenues from sales tax. As 
the import duties-to-GDP ratio declined from 4.82 percent in FY1991 to 1.86 percent 
in FY2001, the sales tax-to-GDP ratio went up from 1.96 percent in FY1991 to 4.49 
percent in FY2001. The inability to raise the overall tax-to-GDP ratio was 
compensated by surcharges from natural gas’ and petroleum products’ sales. Highest 
contribution from surcharges at 2.49 percent of GDP came in FY1999 when the tax-
to-GDP ratio was at its lowest at 10.48 percent during the period reviewed. The share 
of surcharges in total revenues was 19.2 percent in FY1999 with the share of 
petroleum products’ surcharge being over 90 percent of the total surcharge in the 
same year. 
The overall policy thrust during the decade of the 1990s was, therefore, to 
increase the overall tax-to-GDP ratio by focusing on generating a greater share of 
direct taxes. There was commensurate emphasis on liberalisation. The assumption 
was that decrease in custom duties would discourage smuggling and would thereby 
enable higher domestic production that would, in turn, contribute to higher tax 
generation overall. This assumption did not bear out as it was appeared that 
smuggling in Pakistan more an administrative issue than a economic issue. By and 
large, domestic industry was still ill-equipped to compete with imported finished 
goods. Import duty reduction would, therefore, have an adverse impact on domestic 
production capability thereby adversely affecting tax revenue generation The upshot, 
therefore, was a lower share of custom duties which would be offset through a higher 
share of sales tax and periodically through petroleum surcharge, as reviewed above.    
The thrust of the effort remained pretty much the same irrespective of the 
government in the office. However, the elected governments prior to 1996 resisted a 
rapid reduction in import duties more than the ones that followed after the caretaker 
government of 1996-97. A closer look reveals that the share of import duties during 
the Nawaz Sharif government remained at 4.82 percent of GDP during FY1991 to 
FY1993. During the first Benazir year of FY1994, the policy was accommodative 
and the share of import duties fell to 4.27 percent of the GDP. During its second 
year, the Benazir government resisted the pressure to reduce import duties when their 
share was at 4.3 percent of GDP in FY1995. It was in FY1996 that the Benazir 
government yielded somewhat at a time when the government had become too 
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unstable to continue. The import duty-to-GDP ratio in FY1996 fell to 4.07 percent 
(Table 1). It is, however, noteworthy that the overall tax-to-GDP ratio had increased 
to a maximum of 12.05 percent in FY1993 which was the last year of the first Nawaz 
Sharif government. It fell to 11.65 percent during the first year (FY1994) of the 
second Benazir government. It rose back by FY1996 which was the last year of this 
government when it touched 12.26 percent that remains the highest of this ratio 
achieved during the decade of the 1990s or since the tax reform effort was 
undertaken. While these governments resisted pressure to reduce import duties 
significantly, they managed to achieve a steady increase in the ratio of direct taxes-
to-GDP. While the first Nawaz Sharif government had managed to increase this ratio 
from 1.96 percent in FY1991 to 2.68 percent in FY1993, the second Benazir 
government managed to pull this ratio up from 3.0 percent in FY1994 to 3.51 percent 
in FY1996. In addition, the second Benazir government had managed to increase the 
sales tax-to-GDP ratio from 2.04 percent in FY1994 to 2.34 percent in FY1996 
which ratio had actually declined during the first Nawaz Sharif government from 
1.96 percent in FY1991 to 1.79 percent in FY1993 (Table 1). A rather aggressive 
pursuit of sales tax and direct tax generation, inter alia, contributed to an erosion of 
the second Benazir government’s popularity eventually resulting in its premature 
removal. The composition of each tax is given in Table 2. 
The above conclusions are also evident from Tables 3 and 4 when the highest 
average overall tax-to-GDP ratio of 11.95 percent was attained during the second 
Benazir government (1994–96). While the average direct tax-to-GDP ratio was 
pulled up to 3.2 percent by the above government, the average import duties-to-GDP 
ratio had declined marginally to 4.21 percent during the above period. And, the 
average sales tax-to-GDP ratio had been increased to 2.22 percent by the second 
Benazir government. During the second Nawaz Sharif government (1997–99), while 
the average direct tax-to-GDP ratio increased marginally, the average sales tax-to-
GDP ratio did not record a significant increase. However, led by the direction given 
by the caretakers, there was a significant reduction in the average import duties-to-
GDP ratio to 2.8 percent. Consequently, the average overall tax-to-GDP ratio 
declined to 11.08 percent during the second Nawaz Sharif government. 
This ratio would then not rise very significantly even under the military 
government that assumed office in October 1999 even though they started a tough 
tax drive soon after taking charge. So, even though the average sales tax-to-GDP 
ratio increased considerably to 4.13 percent during the above period, the average 
direct tax-to-GDP ratio fell to 3.66 percent. Under the IMF’s diktat, the import 
duties-to-GDP ratio also fell significantly to 1.95 percent. The upshot was the 
inability to significantly increase the overall tax-to-GDP ratio. 
The financial results of FY1997 were influenced by the policies of the 
caretaker government that had taken charge in the Fall of 1996. Their disposition 
steered  the  policy  through  FY1997  and  even  beyond as the second Nawaz Sharif  
Table 1 
Revenue Heads as Shares of GDP, Pakistan’s  
(Percent) 
 
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
1999-
2000 2000-01 2001-02 
Tax Revenue and 
Surcharges 13.12 13.16 13.00 13.24 13.10 13.43 12.65 12.87 12.97 12.20 12.66 13.31 
Tax Revenue 11.82 11.81 12.05 11.65 11.95 12.26 11.64 11.11 10.48 11.05 11.71 12.07 
Income, Corporate 
and  Wealth Tax 1.96 2.23 2.68 3.00 3.08 3.51 3.58 3.80 3.81 3.45 3.86 3.95 
Import Duties 4.82 4.82 4.82 4.27 4.30 4.07 3.38 2.94 2.09 2.04 1.86 1.84 
Export Duties 0.48 0.34 0.07 0.06 0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Federal Excise 2.60 2.64 2.68 2.29 2.73 2.34 2.40 2.35 2.11 1.79 1.50 1.40 
Sales Tax 1.96 1.77 1.79 2.04 2.28 2.34 2.28 2.02 2.47 3.77 4.49 4.88 
Improvements in Tax 
Administration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Surcharges 1.30 1.35 0.96 1.59 1.14 1.17 1.02 1.75 2.49 1.15 0.95 1.24 
Natural  Gas 
Surcharges 0.55 0.62 0.56 0.59 0.45 0.45 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.32 0.43 0.40 
Petroleum 
Surcharge/Levy 0.75 0.73 0.40 1.00 0.69 0.72 0.79 1.52 2.26 0.83 0.52 0.84 
Non-Tax Revenues 4.93 5.24 5.61 5.34 4.14 4.40 3.16 3.91 4.04 4.07 3.41 3.67 
Net Capital Receipts 2.53 –0.79 1.38 2.55 1.38 1.42 0.09 2.27 2.23 1.95 2.75 –015 
Total External 
Resources  3.69 4.19 4.10 5.59 4.75 4.28 4.93 4.62 6.25 5.56 6.24 6.89 
A. Internal Sources 18.05 14.01 15.38 16.13 14.27 14.65 11.13 14.77 15.24 13.96 14.53 12.26 
Budget Deficit as %   
of GDP 5.86 6.58 7.09 6.54 5.36 5.47 6.37 5.6 3.85 3.9 5.36 5.37 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Economic Survey Data. 
Table 2 
Revenue Heads as Shares of Total, Pakistan’s  
(Percent) 
 
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
1999-
2000 2000-01 2001-02 
Tax Revenue and 
Surcharges 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Tax Revenue 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.80 0.90 0.92 0.90 
Income, Corporate 
and  Wealth Tax 
%of  Tax 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.32 0.32 
Import Duties %  
of Tax Revenues 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.15 
Export Duties % of 
Tax Revenue 0.04 0.023 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Federal  Excise % 
of Tax  Revenues 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.11 
Sales Tax 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.23 0.34 0.38 0.40 
Improvements in 
Tax 
Administration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Surcharges 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.09 
Natural  Gas 
Surcharges 0.42 0.46 0.58 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.27 0.45 0.31 
Petroleum 
Surcharge/Levy 0.57 0.53 0.41 0.62 0.60 0.61 078 0.86 0.90 0.72 0.54 0.68 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Economic Survey Data. 
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Table 3 
   
Periodic Average Revenue Heads as Shares of GDP  
(Percent) 
 1991-1993 1994-1996 1996-1997 1997-1999 2000-2001 
Tax Revenue and Surcharges 13.9 13.25 12.65 12.83 12.43 
Tax Revenue 11.89 11.95 11.64 11.08 11.38 
Income, Corporate and   
Wealth Tax 2.29 3.20 3.58 3.72 3.66 
Import Duties 4.82 4.21 3.38 2.80 1.95 
Sales Tax 1.84 2.22 2.28 2.26 4.13 
Surcharges 1.20 1.30 1.02 1.75 1.05 
Natural Gas Surcharges 0.58 0.50 0.22 0.23 0.38 
Petroleum Surcharge/Levy 0.62 0.80 0.79 1.52 0.68 
Total External Resources 4.00 4.87 4.93 5.27 6.23 
A. Internal Resources 15.81 15.01 11.13 13.71 13.58 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Table 4 
Budget Deficit/Tax/PSDP/Debt Ser.-to-GDP Ratios, At a Glance 
Year 
Budget Deficit-to-
GDP 
Overall Tax-to-
GDP PSDP-to-GDP Debt Ser.-to-GDP 
1990-91 5.86% 11.82% 6.17% 6.25% 
1991-92 6.58 11.81 6.53 6.61 
1992-93 7.09 12.05 5.21 7.57 
1993-94 6.54 11.65 4.71 8.19 
1994-95 5.36 11.95 4.35 7.07 
1995-96 5.47 12.26 4.07 7.68 
1996-97 6.30 11.64 3.47 8.08 
1997-98 5.60 11.11 3.33 9.12 
1998-99 3.85 10.48 3.14 9.20 
1999-2001 3.90 11.05 3.16 9.86 
2000-01 5.36 11.71 2.94 8.87 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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government elected in the Spring of 1997 took some time before assuming charge of 
the country’s economy. Most notable development was a drastic reduction in the top 
rate of import duty with the result that the import duties-to-GDP ratio fell to 3.38 
percent in FY1997 from 4.07 percent in FY1996. While an attempt was being made 
to compensate this loss through intense sales tax drive, the sales tax-to-GDP ratio fell 
to 2.28 percent in FY1997 from 2.34 percent in FY1996. Sales tax could not be 
pushed hard enough under a business-friendly Nawaz Sharif government. The direct 
tax-to-GDP ratio increased marginally from 3.51 percent in FY1996 to 3.58 percent 
in FY1997 as the rates of direct taxes were reduced with a view to increasing the tax 
base. The assumption was that a decrease in tax rates would raise the tax revenues as 
the tax base would expand. Since it was not borne out in reality as was the case in the 
US too during the Reagans’ supply-side experiment, the direct tax-to-GDP ratio did 
not increase significantly, as discussed above. The combined effect of a decrease in 
the sales tax-to-GDP ratio, a significant decrease in the import duties-to-GDP ratio, 
and only a marginal increase in the direct tax-to-GDP ratio that could not offset the 
decrease in the former was that the overall tax-to-GDP ratio fell to 11.64 percent in 
FY1997 from 12.26 percent in FY1996.  
Never again during the decade of the 1990s would the overall tax-to-GDP 
ratio touch 12 percent. During the second Nawaz Sharif government, it fell steadily 
from 11.64 percent in FY1997 to 11.11 percent in FY1998 to 10.48 percent in 
FY1999 which was the lowest in the decade of the 1990s. While the second Nawaz 
Sharif government complied with the IMF’s requirement to reduce the rates of 
import duties rapidly, it was unable to offset this decrease through significant 
increase in either direct tax or sales tax. The import duties-to-GDP ratio fell to 2.09 
percent by FY1999. While the direct tax-to-GDP ratio did increase to 3.8 percent in 
FY1998, it remained at 3.81 percent in FY1999 also which was the last year of this 
government. The more trader-friendly Nawaz Sharif government could not make a 
dent in the sales tax effort also. The sales tax-to-GDP ratio actually fell to 2.02 
percent during FY1998 and then rose to 2.47 percent in FY1999 when no other 
avenue could be found to increase the tax-to-GDP ratio. Even though this increase 
was not significant, the second Nawaz Sharif government could achieve this only at 
the expense of its popularity with its major constituency. However, even though the 
overall tax-to-GDP ratio fell during the Nawaz Sharif years, no serious problem 
cropped up with the IMF as the rates of import duties were being reduced in 
compliance with its strictest conditionality. This is in stark contrast with the FY1996 
when the IMF tranche had been held up despite the fact that the overall- and the 
direct tax-to-GDP ratios were both showing upward trends. The sticky issue at that 
time was the reduction in import duties which was not in line with the IMF’s 
requirements and thus the tough time given to the then elected government. 
Since the overthrow of the second Nawaz Sharif government in October 1999, 
the military government of General Pervez Musharraf went all out to plug tax 
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evasion and to increase both direct tax and sales tax revenues. While the direct tax-
to-GDP ratio increased only marginally to 3.86 percent in FY2001 from 3.81 percent 
in FY1999 after actually falling to 3.45 percent in FY2000, the import duties-to-GDP 
ratio decreased to 1.86 percent in FY2001 after a marginal decrease to 2.04 percent 
in FY2000 as time had been bought by the new government for this purpose in 
FY2000. The sales tax effort was pursued more vigorously which resulted in an 
increase of sales tax to 3.77 percent of GDP in FY2000 and 4.49 percent of GDP in 
FY2001. However, the overall tax-to-GDP ratio could only be restored to 11.71 
percent by FY2001 which was slightly better than its level in FY1997. The income 
tax returns for FY2001 registered a negative growth of 17.14 percent7 The total 
returns filed in the Income Tax department by October 1, 2001, which is the last date 
for the filing of returns, were 0.87 million as against 1.05 million filed in the 
previous year.8 The income tax deposited with the returns also decreased to Rs.1.8 
billion in FY2001 from a level of Rs.2.0 billion deposited in the preceding year.9  
The decade of the 1990s can, therefore, be seen as the one throughout which 
there was a great emphasis on increase in direct taxes, reduction in import duties, and 
compensation of the loss in revenue due to the latter through increase in sales tax. 
The combined effect of the above moves, however, did not make a dent in the overall 
tax-to-GDP ratio which not only fluctuated between 10.48 percent and 12.26 percent 
but actually fell from 11.82 percent in FY1991 to 11.71 percent in FY2001. Clearly, 
there were gaps not just in implementation but also in the taxation policy that was 
adopted under the influence of the IMF that emphasised rapid reduction in import 
duties which had been a major source of revenues in a country ill-equipped to 
increase direct tax collection efficiently and equitably. The effort during the decade 
of the 1990s can be characterised as one that aimed more at offsetting the loss from 
import duties’ reduction rather than attempting to increase tax revenue generation as 
such. As is evident from Table 4, while the share of direct taxes increased from 16.6 
percent in FY1991 to 32.9 percent in FY2001 and that of sales tax increased from 
16.6 percent in FY1991 to 38.3 percent in FY2001, the share of import duties in total 
taxes fell from 40.8 percent in FY1991 to 15.9 percent in FY2001. The upshot was a 
bare minimum ability to maintain the overall tax-to-GDP ratio which may be viewed 
as an achievement given the reduction in import duties. Or, it may be viewed as a 
failure given the inability to increase direct taxes and/or sales taxes in proportions 
greater than the decrease in import duties. 
It is worth mentioning that the import duty reduction required by the IMF is at 
a rate higher than that mandated under the WTO agreement. Under the WTO 
agreement, countries are not allowed to increase tariffs beyond the ceiling which is 
known as tariff binding. Tariff binding is set higher than the applied rates for 
developing countries and is given in the Schedule of Commitments for each country. 
 
7Dawn, October 11, 2001. 
8Ibid. 
9Ibid. 
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While an intense sales tax drive had been undertaken in the middle of the 
decade of the 1990s, the budget for FY2000-01 focused specially on tax strategy 
with a view to plugging tax evasion and reforming the CBR. A tax survey was 
undertaken to determine the actual expenditures of the people and to compare them 
with their declared incomes. The exercise did not yield the desired results and was 
then placed on slow burner. It was expected that about  Rs 100 billion in taxes would 
be mobilised through the tax survey in FY2001. State Bank of Pakistan reported that 
taxes mobilised through the tax survey were limited.10 The SBP shied away from 
providing actual figures. As for the CBR reform drive, it was not based on sound 
principles of change management and was, therefore, not successful.11 No significant 
effort could be made even in the direction of agricultural income taxation. The 
taxation system and structure remained about as inefficient and inequitous12 as it had 
been prior to the fiscal reform effort undertaken in the 1990s and intensified around 
the turn of FY2000-01. 
 
Impact on the Budget Deficits  
While the IMF kept emphasising the budget deficit targets as percentage of 
the GDP, these requirements were more stringent during the second Benazir 
government (1994–96) than they have been since the caretakers assumed office late-
1996. During the caretakers’ influenced year of FY1997, the budget deficit-to-GDP 
ratio increased to 6.3 percent from 5.47 percent in FY1996 as the overall tax-to-GDP 
ratio fell in FY1997 mainly because of a significant reduction in import duties in that 
year. However, generally during the decade of the 1990s, there appears to be a lack 
of a correlation between the overall tax-to-GDP and the budget deficit-to-GDP 
ratios.  
The budget deficit-to-GDP ratios depicted an upward trend during the first 
Nawaz Sharif government even though the overall tax-to-GDP ratio increased from 
11.82 percent in FY1991 to 12.05 percent in FY1993. The budget deficit-to-GDP 
ratio increased from 5.86 percent in FY1991 to 7.09 percent in FY1993 showing a 
lack of relationship between tax effort and budget deficit. While the budget deficit-
to-GDP ratio fell during the second Benazir government as the overall tax-to-GDP 
ratio increased from FY1994 to FY1996, the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio increased 
from FY1995 to FY1996 even though the overall tax-to-GDP ratio increased year-
on-year as shown in Table 3. 
The budget deficit-to-GDP ratio declined during the second Nawaz Sharif 
government even though the overall tax-to-GDP ratio registered a decline too from 
 
10Mahnaz Fatima. “Tax ‘strategy’ implementation in 2000-01.” Dawn, Economic and Business 
Review. June 11-17, 2001. III. 
11Ibid. 
12Qazi Masood Ahmed. “Structure of Public Finances: Historical Perspectives and Future 
Prospects”.  Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics. Vol. 14, Nos. 1 & 2. 1998. pp. 89–105.  
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11.64 percent in FY1997 to 10.48 percent in FY1999. The budget deficit-to-GDP 
ratio declined from 6.3 percent in FY1997 to 3.85 percent in FY1999. The lowest 
budget deficit-to-GDP ratio for the period studied is recorded in the year which also 
had the lowest overall tax-to-GDP ratio during the decade of the 1990s. And, when 
the overall tax-to-GDP ratio was pulled back up to 11.71 percent during the military 
government, the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio also increased to 5.36 percent. The 
decade of the 1990s clearly shows a lack of relationship between Pakistan’s overall 
tax-to-GDP ratio and the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. Clearly, there is more to 
Pakistan’s budget deficit reduction than the impact of an increase in tax generation. 
It would be important to next study the expenditures’ pattern during the decade of 
the 1990s. 
 
3.  IMPACT OF EXPENDITURES ON BUDGET DEFICIT 
While a relationship between PSDP and budget deficit cannot be ascertained in 
isolation from a trend analysis of their levels during the decade of the 1990s, it can be 
concluded that budget deficit-to-GDP ratio was kept contained by also reducing the 
PSDP significantly. The debt servicing-to-GDP ratio increased from 6.25 percent in 
FY1991 to 9.2 percent in FY1999 but the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio declined from 
5.86 percent in FY1991 to 3.85 percent in FY1999, as shown in Table 4. While this 
decrease in the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio was, inter alia, contributed by a decrease in 
defence expenditure-to-GDP ratio from 6.23 percent in FY1991 to 4.36 percent in 
FY1999, the PSDP-to-GDP ratio also fell from 6.17 percent in 1990-91 to 3.14 percent 
in FY1999. However, while the PSDP-to-GDP ratio declined since FY1992, the budget 
deficit-to-GDP ratio fluctuated during the period studied. (Table 4.) 
It cannot, therefore, be said that there is a direct relationship between 
development expenditure reduction and the reduction in budget deficit. At best, 
development expenditure reduction may have kept the budget deficit contained when 
all other measures failed to do so in various years or when rising debt-servicing and 
decreasing import duties created additional pressure on budget deficits.     
 
4.  INCREASE IN EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE 
Tables 5 and 6 shows various expenditure heads as percentage GDP and of 
total current expenditures during the period studied from FY1991 to FY2001. While 
the share of expenditures on defence, social services, economic services, and 
subsidies declined during the period studied; the share of debt-servicing rose from 
37.2 percent in FY1991 to 53.2 percent in FY2001.  
And, while the interest on foreign debt was kept contained mainly through 
rescheduling, the interest on domestic debt showed an increasing trend. However, 
reliance on external resources to finance the budget deficit more than doubled during 
the period studied as shown in Table 8. As the share of internal resources in total 
resources  declined  from  83 percent in FY1991 to almost 70 percent in FY2001, the  
Table 5 
Various Expenditure Heads as Percent of GDP 
(Percent) 
 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 
Federal Current Expenditure 16.82 16.42 17.52 17.31 15.65 16.49 16.20 17.05 16.28 17.76 16.70 
General Administration 0.71 0.82 0.82 0.92 0.98 0.91 0.86 0.73 0.59 0.61 1.43 
Defence 6.23 6.25 6.52 5.96 5.33 5.38 5.19 5.00 4.36 4.50 3.79 
Debt Servicing 6.25 6.61 7.57 8.19 7.07 7.68 8.08 9.12 9.20 9.86 8.87 
Interest on Domestic  Debt 3.29 3.87 4.70 4.98 4.06 4.57 4.71 5.69 5.43 5.78 5.34 
Interest on Foreign  Debt 1.35 1.17 1.23 1.31 1.21 1.25 1.21 1.11 1.32 1.59 1.46 
Repayment of Foreign Debt 1.61 1.57 1.64 1.90 1.80 1.87 2.16 2.32 2.45 2.49 2.08 
Community Services 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.20 
Social Services 0.55 0.49 0.55 0.47 0.47 0.41 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.33 0.30 
Economic Services 0.44 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Subsidies 0.80 0.68 0.39 0.33 0.20 0.49 0.31 0.24 0.33 0.45 0.65 
PSDP 6.17 6.53 5.21 4.71 4.35 4.07 3.47 3.33 3.14 3.16 2.94 
Budget Deficit –5.86 –6.58 –7.09 –6.54 5.36 –5.47 –6.30 5.66 3.85 –3.89 –5.36 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Economic Survey Data. 
Table 6 
Various Expenditure Heads as Percent of Total Current Expenditures 
 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
1999-
2000 2000-01 
Federal Current Expenditure 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
General Administration 0.04 0.05 0.040 0.05 0.06 0.54 0.53 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.08 
All Other Expenditures            
Defence 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.22 
Law and Order 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Community Services 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Social Services 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Economic Services 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Subsidies 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Debt Servicing 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.53 
Interest on Domestic Debt 0.52 0.58 0.62 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.60 
Interest on Foreign Debt 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.16 
Repayment of Foreign Debt 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.23 
Grants and Unallocable  0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 
Cut in Non-salary Expenditures             
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Economic Survey Data. 
Table 7 
Financing of the Deficit 
 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
1999-
2000 2000-01 
Financing of the Deficit            
Non-Bank Borrowings as 
Percent of Deficit 0.43 –0.11 0.17 0.24 0.25 0.29 –0.01 0.39 0.57 –0.01 0.43 
Net External Resources as 
Percent of Deficit 0.35 0.39 0.34 0.56 0.55 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.96 0.79 0.77 
Bank Borrowings as Percent 
Deficit 0.21 0.72 0.47 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.57 0.20 –0.54 0.22 –0.21 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Economic Survey Data. 
 
Table 8 
Internal and External Resources as % age of Total Resources  
 
1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 
1999-
2000 2000-01 
Resources            
A. Internal Resources  0.83 0.76 0.78 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.69 0.76 0.70 0.71 0.69 
Revenue Receipts Percent of 
Total  Internal Res 0.81 0.97 0.89 0.82 0.84 0.83 0.94 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.76 
Capital Receipts Percent of Total 
Internal Res 0.14 –0.05 0.08 –0.15 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.18 
Autonomous Bodies Percent of 
Total Internal Res 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.04 
Financing  of SAP Percent of 
Total Internal Res 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
B. External Resources 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.30 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.30 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Economic Survey Data. 
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share of external resources in total resources increased from about 17 percent in 
FY1991 to 30 percent in FY2001. Despite an intense fiscal reform effort, the 
increase in external dependence demonstrates the lack of success of fiscal reform. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis demonstrates that the efforts to increase the overall tax-to-GDP 
ratio did not prove to be successful. However, the contribution of various types of 
taxes to total tax collection did change. While the share of direct taxes and sales 
tax increased, that of import duties fell significantly. Import duties underwent 
drastic reduction mainly under IMF’s pressure to liberalise trade more than that 
required even under the WTO agreements. While this measure definitely affected 
domestic industrial production adversely as most domestic producers are still ill-
prepared to compete with imported finished goods, domestic production effort also 
experienced the negative impact of increase in direct and sales taxes. As the IMF 
prescribed tax effort was deflationary, significant increases in output could not be 
recorded that could have fed back favourably into tax generation and budget deficit 
reduction. 
The upshot was that a relationship between the tax-to-GDP ratio and the 
budget deficit-to-GDP ratio could not be ascertained. Despite this, the governments 
mostly remained determined to follow the IMF prescriptions about tax reforms too. 
The second Benazir government that resisted the IMF in import duty reduction soon 
found itself out of the office. Pakistan’s taxation reform was, therefore, driven not 
just by domestic politico-economic considerations but also by those of the countries 
which are the major financiers of the IMF. These countries would like to have our 
economic frontiers thrown open so that their manufactured products and services 
find easy passage into the markets of developing countries. 
As the overall tax-to-GDP ratio could not be increased appreciably, budget 
deficits had to be kept contained by decreasing the development expenditure. This 
was required all the more also because of increasing pressure on debt-servicing. As 
percentage share of internal resources in total resources declined due to the reasons 
discussed herein, the share of external resources increased. Pakistan’s reliance on 
external financing increased due to a tax reform effort that remained unsuccessful 
not only intrinsically as it failed to generate more resources internally but also 
because it affected the production potential of the country adversely. This latter 
effect fed back into the issue of budget deficits and rising external dependence. 
More requirement of external financing means more of the financiers’ 
conditionalities. That is, the above cycle stands reinforced when the need is to 
break away from it. While the fiscal reform exercise has been self-defeating, we 
pursue more of it as it suits both domestic and international politico-economic 
agendas. 
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